

THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE PEISISTRATEAN TYRANNY

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INTRODUCTION

How did archaic Greek tyrants come to power? And how did they keep it? Our sources are less than forthcoming with answers to these questions. Only rarely do we receive information about the methods actually employed. When economic or socio-economic explanations of archaic tyranny were *en vogue* the solution to the problem was sought in some form or other of what might be called 'class struggle': the lower and/or the middle classes must have lent their support to the aspiring tyrant, it seemed, because he could and would break the power of the ruling aristocrats. As for the actual *coup d'état*, it must have been the new 'hoplite class' (a middle class who could afford to equip themselves as hoplites, socially in between the aristocrats and the lower classes or *thētes*) whose siding with the would-be tyrant had been decisive. This was, in essence, the view advocated by such scholars as Andrewes (1971 (1956): 31-38), Berve (1967: 8-12), Mossé (1969: 3-8), Pleket (1969: 32-38) and others.

A clear reaction against this view was presented in an article by R. Drews (1972: 129-144), who argued that the sources, scanty though they might be, do not support the reconstruction outlined above. Instead, what indications we have point to other factors, *viz.* the tyrants coming to power with the help of military forces lent to them by friends or allies from abroad. These *epikouroi*, according to Drews, are for the most part certainly to be considered as hoplites, but not necessarily as a 'middle class' driven by anti-aristocratic sentiments. On the contrary, they might very well have been aristocrats themselves; in any case they must have been a restless element in society: younger sons or bastards in want of an heritage, the 'retainers' of some

powerful aristocrat, adventurers of all sorts. The ‘bronze men’ from Ionia and Karia who turned up in the Egyptian Delta and then helped Psammetichos free the country from Assyrian rule belonged to this category, as did the Karian *epikouroi* of Gyges, tyrant-king of Lydia. Drews pointed out that all statements in our sources as to the means by which archaic tyrants in Greece seized power can be interpreted in the same way. Whenever we hear of a *coup* by a tyrant or would-be tyrant, it is always military *epikouroi* or more generally military support from another tyrant or from other foreign friends that are involved.

In my PhD-thesis I accepted this view and argued that these military supporters of the archaic tyrants might very well have been hoplites, but then hoplites *not* in the sense of a non-aristocratic ‘hoplite class’, but the typical hoplites of archaic Greece, *i.e.*, generally those belonging to the elite of society. Further, I proposed a negative correlation between ‘tyranny’ and a non-aristocratic ‘hoplite class’, arguing that in archaic Greece tyranny could arise precisely because such a ‘hoplite class’ did *not* exist, and that the disappearance of the tyranny of the Peisistratids in Athens was followed by the creation of just such a citizen-hoplite army in the reforms of Kleisthenes (Singor 1988: 317-321).

Recently, the interpretation of the *epikouroi* and especially of the *doruphoroi* as *foreign* troops assisting the (would-be) tyrants, and more precisely as *mercenaries* – an interpretation essential to Drews’ view of archaic tyranny and also accepted by scholars of the older school, although the latter would not attach much value to these troops as an over-all explanation of the phenomenon of tyranny – has come under strong attack by Lavelle (1992a: 78-97). So it seems the whole question needs renewed investigation. In this I shall restrict myself to the case of Athens and the Peisistratids.

SOME MILITARY DATA IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE SIXTH-CENTURY ATHENIAN TYRANNY

On the over-all military background against which the rise and fall of the Peisistratid tyranny took place a few statements can at present be made with at least a little confidence, even if they are often negative in character:

1. The military organization of the Athenian state before Kleisthenes remains for us beyond reconstruction. There is hardly any piece of positive evidence from which we could distil some information as to the organization of the city’s military forces. The Solonian census class of the *zeugitai* at any

rate did certainly not constitute a 'hoplite class', as is still argued by some (*cf.* Whitehead 1981: 282-286), but got its name from the possession of a yoke of oxen (*zeugos*) as a distinguishing mark and property census for those belonging to it; it did not have any directly military implications (Singor 1988: 311-317). On the other hand, it is practically certain that there must have been some form of military organization; for instance, the existence of the *archōn polemarchos*, although not unequivocally established for the sixth century, should nevertheless be assumed for the entire archaic period and points undoubtedly to some form or other of public organization of warfare. If the six *lēxiarchoi* (Pollux VIII 10) go back to pre-Kleisthenic times (and this is only a conjecture based on their 'archaic' number six, *cf.* Van Effenterre 1976: 8-14), the system of deme registers for military mobilization might have been in use already before the revolution of 510-507, but this is conjecture built upon conjecture. Likewise, the registers of the *phratriai* in which all citizens were recorded when they came of age could conceivably have existed already before Kleisthenes and could then have been used as muster rolls – but this is again only conjecture (Frost 1984: 284-285). In fact, we are completely in the dark as to the actual shape the military organization might have taken. To assume, as many scholars do, that the four pre-Kleisthenic *phulai* provided four army regiments on the analogy of the ten *taxeis* of democratic Athens (*e.g.* Siewert 1982: 154-155) is unwarranted. In any case, Kleisthenes did not find such an organization in existence in the crucial years 510-507 (*cf.* van Effenterre 1976: 1-4) and almost certainly did not model his ten *phulai* organization after any image or memory people might have had of it. It is probable, though, that the older four *phulai* did indeed once have some military function: for all we know, the four *phulai* may go back to the eighth century and may have functioned in mobilizing the fighters of the early polis of Athens in time of war, but we do not know who actually did the fighting then: a few well-equipped aristocrats (one thinks of Tellos and his like: Hdt. I 30.4-5) or *all* able-bodied men, or some selection in between – and if the latter were the case, we simply do not know who were selected and by whom. I presume that all three possibilities were feasible and could be realized as the circumstances might require, depending on the nature of the enemy and the type of warfare (all-out war or a more restricted and regulated conflict), but that in itself does not tell us much. In short, on the organisational level almost nothing can be said. One negative point should be stressed, however: archaic Athens had no citizen-hoplite class and no citizen-hoplite army comparable with the thousands of hoplite-citizens it had in the time of the Persian War

and beyond. More precisely: before Kleisthenes there was no such citizen-army (Frost 1984: 283-294); indeed, such an organization must have been the work of Kleisthenes (Singor 1988: 302-306). In pre-Peisistratid Athens hoplites were clearly the aristocrats or at least the rich (in Solonian census terms: the *Pentakosiomedimnoi* and the *Hippeis*). What role the lower classes could play in a serious war is not immediately clear, but one can presume that in times of emergency they could be called up to fight with what weapons were at hand: stones and sticks. It was probably such a *levée en masse* of the countryfolk led by well-armed aristocrats that was called up against the would-be tyrant Kylon on the Akropolis shortly before 600 BC (Hdt. V 70-71; Thuc. I 126). In general, though, the mass of the population seems to have been hardly, if at all, involved in actual warfare during the greater part of the sixth century.

2. Athens certainly waged wars in the time before Kleisthenes (they are treated in detail by Stahl 1987: 204-226, more concisely by Frost 1984: 285-290), but nearly all information on these archaic wars that has come down to us is legendary in character. From this it does not follow that there had been *no* wars between Athens and Aigina or Athens and Megara in the sixth century, or that Athens did *not* conquer Sigeion at some time in that century, but from the stories we have we hardly learn anything about the modalities of war (numbers, army organisation, equipment, mode of fighting, etc.). However, the stories do convey a strong impression of restricted, 'aristocratic' warfare (duels, simple ruses of war, arbitration, and the like – cf. Singor 1988: 246-288), a type of warfare that in its turn suggests relatively small numbers involved (cf. Frost 1984: 289).

3. Considering the question of the archaic tyrant's seizure of power, in particular the question of how Peisistratos of Athens finally secured his rule, there is no clear statement in our sources of means other than military (or presupposing military power in the background) in establishing a more or less secure tyranny. In the case of Peisistratos there are some positive indications of the role played by the organisation of military power (Athenian or foreign, private or public) in his rise to tyranny and during his rule and that of his sons. These indications are the following:

– In 561/0 (conventional date) Peisistratos seized the Akropolis with the help of his *korunēphoroi* or club-bearers (Hdt. I 59.5-6; *AthPol.* 14.1). Later sources give as the number of this bodyguard of Athenian citizens, assigned to Peisistratos by vote of the assembly, 50 (Plut. *Sol.* 30.3) or 300 (Polyaen. I 21.3; *schol.* ad Plato, *Rep.* 566B).

– In 546/5 (conventional date) Peisistratos landed in Attika with a force consisting of an unstated number of Thebans (Hdt. I 61.3; *AthPol.* 15.2), of some men led by Lygdamis from Naxos (Hdt. I 61.3; *AthPol.* 15.2), of Argive mercenaries (*misthōtoi*) (Hdt. I 61.4) numbering one thousand and commanded in battle by Peisistratos' son Hegesistratos (*AthPol.* 17.4), and of an unknown number of mercenaries from the Pangaion region in Thrace (*AthPol.* 15.2). After his landing his political friends from the city of Athens and a number of people from the villages “who much preferred tyranny to freedom” joined his forces in the plain of Marathon (Hdt. I 62.1).

– After his victory at Pallene (Hdt. I 63 – note the two ruses) Peisistratos, with a lot of money and many *epikouroi*, finally had his tyranny take root in Athens (Hdt. I 64.1).

– Having secured his position in Athens Peisistratos disarmed the Athenian citizenry according to *AthPol.* 15.3-5 (but according to Thuc. VI 56.2; 58 this happened much later, in 514, under the rule of his son Hippias).

– In 546/5 or a little later Peisistratos subdued Naxos ‘in a war’ and installed his friend Lygdamis there as tyrant (Hdt. I 64.2; *AthPol.* 15.3).

– In 519 ‘the Athenians’ defeated the Thebans and concluded an alliance with Plataea (Hdt. VI 108; Thuc. III 68.5).

– In the year of the murder of Hipparchos his brother Hippias could count on *doruphoroi* (Thuc. VI 56.2; 57.1; 57.4) and/or *epikouroi* (Thuc. VI 58.2; cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1357b 31-33; *phulakē*).

– In 513 (?) the exiled Alkmaionidai and others fortified Leipsydriion against the tyrant Hippias (Hdt. V 62.2), but were expelled by the forces of the latter (*AthPol.* 19.3; Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 665).

– In 511 (?) when attacked by a Lakedaimonean force under Anchimolios Hippias called in the help of his Thessalian allies: an *epikouriē* of a thousand cavalry was sent under king Kineas which defeated the landing force of Anchimolios (Hdt. V 63.2-4; *AthPol.* 19.5).

– In 510 the Spartan king Kleomenes with a bigger army defeated the Thessalian horsemen (who retired to Thessaly) and besieged Hippias on the Akropolis (Hdt. V 64; *AthPol.* 19.5).

In assessing the value of these pieces of information it is necessary now to ascertain as far as possible the nature of the military support the Peisistratids enjoyed: citizens, friends, allies, mercenaries?

THE QUESTION OF PEISISTRATOS' EPIKOUROI

Peisistratos' military supporters – at least those who assisted him in the campaign of Pallene – have been generally considered to have been non-Athenian troops and more specifically mercenaries. The term *epikouroi* in fact has been interpreted as an equivalent, more or less, to *misthophoroi*, *misthōtoi* and the like. The troops hired by Peisistratos in Thrace have often been seen as Thracian peltasts, whose presence in Attic vase painting of the period (from ca. 540 on) would attest their coming to Athens in the following of the tyrant (Best 1969: 6; Rhodes 1981: 208; Shapiro 1983b: 107). Even Scythian archers were thought to have been brought to Athens by Peisistratos, considering their appearance on Attic vases from about 530 to just after 500 (Vos 1963: 66-67; Shapiro 1983b: 112). While the allies from Thebes, Eretria and Naxos would have returned home in 546/5 or soon after, the mercenaries from Argos would have stayed on as the tyrants' crack regiment of hoplites (Berve 1967: 52; Bing 1976/77: 312-313). In this view the *epikouroi* and *doruphoroi* in the service of Hippias must have been essentially those foreign troops staying in Athens to prop up the tyranny. It is this interpretation that has come under attack now by B.M. Lavelle, whose main arguments against the current view are the following:

Firstly, the term *epikouroi* does not invariably signify 'mercenaries'. Actually, in origin it means just 'allies', and in Herodotos and Thucydides it can mean both 'allies' and 'mercenaries'. Herodotos, however, uses the term primarily in the sense of 'allies' – as is illustrated, for instance, by his emphatic use of *misthōtoi* for the Argive 'mercenaries' in I 61.4 (Lavelle 1992a: 80-82). Secondly, Athens in the mid-sixth century BC must have been far too poor to be able to afford a permanent corps of, say, 300 mercenaries; and not only the Athenian state was poor, so too was Peisistratos himself (Lavelle 1992a: 81-88). Thirdly, by far most of the supporters of Peisistratos in 546/5 were allies and friends; only a small part (those explicitly referred to at *AthPol.* 15.2) can have been mercenaries. Even the thousand Argives fought for Peisistratos out of *philia* (*AthPol.* 17.4) and therefore not for money. That Herodotos calls them *misthōtoi* (I 61.4) is pure slander – to be explained by Athenian animosity towards Argos after the Persian attack on Athens and Argive neutrality in 480 (Lavelle 1992a: 82-83). Fourthly, when Peisistratos finally 'fixed' his tyranny 'firmly' with the help of many *epikouroi* and a lot of money (Hdt. I 64.1), that is to be understood as referring to the events of the battle of Pallene and its direct aftermath, in other

words to a single campaign, and not to an on-going situation (Lavelle 1992a: 84-85). Fifthly, even if Athens had had the means to maintain a troop of mercenaries in the period 546/5 – 510, its size would have been too small to control an unwilling population (witness the events around king Kleomenes' intervention in 508/7) and its presence, moreover, would have been counter-productive, considering Athenian mistrust and aversion of Thracian and Scythian barbarians (Lavelle 1992a: 91-92). Sixthly and finally, we have some positive indications that Athenians rather than foreigners who served as the tyrants' *doruphoroi*: in the later fifth century politicians like 'Paphlagon' (=Kleon) and Antiphon could come under attack for their grandfathers having been *doruphoroi* of the Peisistratids. The chorus of Old Men in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (664-666) on the point of attacking the Akropolis held by the women recall the time when they marched against Leipsydion, thereby implying service for the tyrant Hippias against his aristocratic foes. Also, Peisistratos' first *coup* was carried out by his Athenian *korunēphoroi*, proving the existence of support, even military if necessary, for the tyrant among the Athenian population; in reality, though, the Athenians serving in the tyrants' standing force cannot be considered as crack troops, their service being more or less honorary and – as the events in 514 and 510 would prove – not very effective (Lavelle 1992a: 93-95).

These arguments, culminating in the suggestion that not only Peisistratos but archaic Greek tyrants generally depended on a military following from their own countrymen and *not* on foreign mercenaries (Lavelle 1992a: 96), seem to build a strong case for revision of the current views. On closer inspection, however, it will be clear that none of the arguments can be considered decisive:

1. As for the term *epikouroi*, its meaning is ambiguous, for even 'allies' must often be fed and maintained by those in whose service they appear. There is no sharp dividing line between an 'ally' fighting for someone who takes care of his daily needs, and a 'mercenary' who receives payment for his service. Allies staying on after the campaign turn into professional soldiers, but also a permanent corps of soldiers from the citizenry itself has by its nature to be maintained by the state (or the tyrant) they serve and therefor are hard to distinguish financially from foreign mercenaries. (As is well known the *misthos* for citizen-hoplites and for mercenary hoplites was as a rule in classical Greece the same amount of money, cf. Pritchett 1974: 3-29). It is quite likely that troops consisting of Theban and Eretrian friends did not stay on with Peisistratos after his capture of Athens in 546/5 and went home as the

tyrant's 'allies', while the Argives did stay and thereby, because they had to be fed and housed, automatically became 'mercenaries', even if they had not been considered as such from the beginning. In both cases the term *epikouroi* could be employed. In fact, Thucydides, speaking of the troops in the service of Hippias – on Lavelle's account Athenian *doruphoroi* – calls them both *doruphoroi* and *epikouroi*, thus implying the presence of at least some foreign troops in Athens by that time, for *epikouroi* certainly would not refer to Athenian troops (of course, one could say, as Lavelle does, that this must have been a mistake or a slip of the pen by Thucydides, but that is certainly a poor argument).

2. That Athens was too poor to maintain a troop of mercenaries in the mid-sixth century is a mere assumption and, moreover, an unnecessary one. For in the first place we do not know anything about the rate of pay. Lavelle's suggestion of half a drachma a day (Lavelle 1992a: 87) seems to me to be far too high and is at least arbitrary (during the Peloponnesian War half a drachma a day was customary and one drachma exceptional, *cf.* Pritchett 1974: 14-17). Most of the so-called *Wappenmünzen* are didrachms (Kraay 1976: 57-59) and I still cannot see why these coins which are generally dated to the early years of the Peisistratean tyranny, should not be explained as mercenaries' pay (*cf.* Cook 1958: 261), connected with pay rates of perhaps two drachmas per half-month or even per month (if the prices mentioned by Plut. *Sol.* 23.3: one drachma for one sheep or one *medimnos* of grain, five drachmas for one ox, are anything to go by). That the silver contained in the *Wappenmünzen* has been proven to stem from a variety of non-Attic sources (Kraay 1976: 58-59; Lavelle 1992a: 88) can only be seen as corroborating the tradition that Peisistratos collected money from various places for his campaign of 546/5 (Hdt. I 61.3; 64.1; *AthPol.* 15.2). Secondly, whatever the exact amount of payments to his mercenaries may have been, financially it cannot have made much difference whether Peisistratos maintained a troop of hoplites from Argos or from among his Athenian countrymen. For in both cases the tyrant must have paid for his troops' expenses and on the analogy of the situation in the later fifth century we do not have to assume a priori that foreign mercenaries received higher pay than a standing force of citizen troops. In the third place, we have no evidence to decide whether or not Peisistratos himself was too poor in 546/5 to hire substantial numbers of mercenaries; that he received money from friends and cities who owed him (Hdt. I 61.3) does not at all prove that he was financially in dire straits, it only indicates that he needed a lot of money at precisely that moment – which is,

of course, understandable enough when one thinks of the necessary payments for his troops. It seems to me rather perverse to argue from this that Peisistratos could not have hired many mercenaries for the campaign of Pallene and that therefore (?) his army would have consisted mainly of 'allies'. The same applies in my opinion to the situation after Pallene: we have insufficient evidence for an assessment of the tyrant's or the state's regular income and therefore we can certainly not exclude on financial grounds alone the existence of a standing corps of soldiers, foreign or Athenian, who must necessarily have been paid. The financial situation of Athens or of Peisistratos himself, then, cannot be an argument to reject the possibility of a standing corps of mercenaries in Peisistratid Athens.

3. Likewise, the numbers of the various contingents of Peisistratos' army in 546/5 are unknown and it is consequently impossible to say whether 'allies' or 'mercenaries' formed the bulk of his troops. As stated above, the troops from Thebes, Eretria and the followers of Lygdamis can best be considered allies in the more or less conventional sense of the term, and we may assume that they returned home shortly after the end of the campaign. On the other hand, I see no reason to doubt that Peisistratos hired mercenaries in the Pangaion region (*AthPol.* 15.2) and that these mercenaries were mostly or even exclusively Thracian peltasts: it is still the best explanation for their appearance in Attic vase paintings of the period (see above, *pace* Lavelle 1992a: 87-89). Some Scythian archers may have come a little later, after Peisistratos had secured his power, perhaps from the region of the Thracian Chersonese. The Argive troops numbered one thousand according to *AthPol.* 17.4, but that number is suspect (*cf.* the 'thousand' Thessalian horse helping Hippias). Nevertheless, it is surely unconvincing to argue that these cannot have been mercenaries because they fought for Peisistratos out of friendship. Such a friendship or alliance certainly does not preclude the possibility that Peisistratos hired these men; the *philia* of the Argives can be sufficiently explained by their willingness to let Peisistratos collect soldiers in their territory. In any case, the fact that Peisistratos' son Hegesistratos is said to have commanded them in battle does not point to allies (who normally have their own commanders) but indeed to mercenaries, precisely the *misthōtoi* mentioned by Herodotos (certainly without any slander intended!). Finally, after his landing in Attika Peisistratos was joined by an unknown number of Athenian partisans. Of all these troops it is quite conceivable that after the victory only the peltasts and the Argive *doruphoroi* remained with the tyrant, serving as his standing guard, while the others returned to their respective

homes. In any case there is not the slightest evidence that in the Pallene campaign mercenaries formed only a minority of Peisistratos' army and disappeared completely once the city had been taken.

4. Lavelle's attempt at reinterpreting the famous phrase about Peisistratos' tyranny 'being rooted' (Hdt. I 64.1) falls short as well. According to Lavelle we should take this as a reference to the campaign just won and *not* to the duration of the tyranny itself. To my mind the context of Hdt. I 64 makes this interpretation impossible. Herodotos says that Peisistratos 'rooted' his tyranny *after* he had taken the city of Athens (this, of course, refers to the Pallene campaign) and *after* he had taken hostages from Athenian opponents remaining in Athens (which points to the situation when Peisistratos had victoriously entered the city), *after* he had installed Lygdamis as tyrant of Naxos and finally *after* he had ritually purified the island of Delos (which refers to an event during his tyranny, presumably in connection with the installation of Lygdamis). Herodotos' construction with its many participles aorist (σχωὼν 'Αθήνας., παῖδας λαβὼν., καταστήσας (Λυγδ.),., τὴν νῆσον Δῆλον καθήρας) hangs on the one main verb ἐρρίζωσε (τὴν τυραννίδα) which clearly is the result of all the actions mentioned, both during and after the campaign of 546/5. By contrast, when Peisistratos lost his power for the first time, that was because 'it had not yet been firmly rooted' (Hdt. 60.1), a phrase repeated in *AthPol.* 14.3, where it is nevertheless stated that the first tyranny ended in its 'sixth year'. When the final 'rooting' of the tyranny is connected directly with many *epikouroi* and a lot of money (Hdt. I 64.1), the men and money referred to must have played their role then during the campaign *and after* (for instance in the otherwise unknown expedition to Naxos to install Lygdamis). At any rate we have no right to restrict the use of these resources by Peisistratos only to the short campaign that brought him to power.

5. Lavelle further argues that a troop of foreign mercenaries staying on in Athens during the tyranny would have been both insufficient and counter-productive. This too is mere assumption. To start with, we simply do not know how many mercenaries the tyrants had (the number of one thousand Argives is by itself not very reliable, I believe, but it might be taken as an indication that it was rather substantial according to the tradition of *AthPol.*). In his argumentation Lavelle assumes a number of 300, but that is the typical number of a tyrant's bodyguard (and very often of other special elite troops, cf. Singor 1988: 277-279) and we do not have to take it for granted that all the *doruphoroι/epikouroι* of Hippias numbered no more than 300. The parallels with Kleomenes' interventions do not tell us much. At his first invasion the

Spartan king was able to dislodge Hippias from the Akropolis because he had captured the tyrant's children and so could force him to surrender the city; at his second visit to Athens he was accompanied by only a small entourage, not by his army, and so could be forced to retreat from the Akropolis (together with Isagoras and his partisans) by an infuriated *dēmos*. One should not underestimate the effectiveness of even a small troop of heavily-armed and well-trained infantry in the face of a vastly more numerous but unorganized and unarmed people – in fact this simple truth explains the domination, exerted for so long, by Spartans over their helots, or, on a much grander scale, by the Hellenistic kings and their professional armies over the indigenous populations of Egypt and the Near East, or by the Roman legions over a 'pacified' Mediterranean world. As for the situation in Athens under the Peisistratids, there is no reason to doubt that the citizens had been disarmed. This was achieved according to *AthPol.* 15.4-5 by Peisistratos himself shortly after his seizure of Athens, or, alternatively, according to Thuc. VI 58 by Hippias on the occasion of the murder of Hipparchos. There is no way of proving which of the two sources is correct (the trick in both stories is essentially the same), but I presume that Thucydides is to be preferred (which would allow for the possible existence of some public organisation for mobilizing the citizen-army during the greater part of the tyranny, in which case the campaign in Boiotia of 519 BC (Hdt. VI 108) should almost certainly be attributed to that citizen-army and not to the standing troops of the tyrant). Even so, we should conclude that the number of Athenian hoplites by that time apparently was very small, since they could all be addressed by Hippias and ordered to lay down their weapons in a certain spot (τὸ χωρὶον – 58.2) on the *agora* (or, according to *AthPol.* 15.4, be addressed by Peisistratos and induced to leave their weapons within the precinct of the Theseion where they were collected and stored in the buildings of the sanctuary, cf. Frost 1984: 291; see also Rhodes 1981: 210). In any case, we have no right to assume that a professional body of soldiers would not be capable of holding the city of Athens, even when those citizens who could afford hoplite equipment had not been disarmed before 514, since the latter cannot have been very numerous. In general they must have belonged to the upper classes and it was from among these that Peisistratos had taken his hostages: although we do not know for how long these hostages were held, the fact itself might also explain to some extent why there was no sign of opposition to the tyranny in Athens before 514.

As for the suggestion that the Athenians had such aversion to barbarian Thracians and Scythians that any attempt by Peisistratos to use these troops as a garrison in Athens would have been counter-productive and would have provoked the citizens to hatred and rebellion, it should be said that all this is again mere assumption. Counter-arguments should be considered. The supposed ethnic aversion on the part of the Athenians of barbarian peoples is something more or less typical of the classical age, especially after the defeat of the Persians and the growth of the Athenian empire, and not of the age of the tyrants: at least it is something not to be simply assumed for that earlier period when Athenians heard of and saw these barbarians for the first time. Further, even in classical Athens the democracy maintained a troop of Scythian 'policemen', so why could the tyrants not have done the same and introduced some Scythians into the city and into some of their army units? For Athenian vases of the period from ca. 530 to ca 490 regularly depict Scythian archers in what might be called tactical formations with Greek hoplites (Vos 1963: 6-80). Similarly, the appearance of Thracian peltasts on Athenian vases from ca. 540 on has been explained by their service as mercenaries for the tyrants (Best 1969: 5-7; Rhodes 1981: 208; Shapiro 1983b: 107). To my mind this is still by far the best explanation for the presence of Scythians and Thracians in Attic vase painting of the time. Suggestions as to the painters gaining knowledge of these peoples by Athenian trade contacts via Sigeion and the Chersonese (Lavelle 1992a: 87) are much less convincing. Precisely the novelty of these exotic warriors in Athens will have inspired the vase-painters. They need not have been very numerous and I suspect that their numbers must have been very small indeed. Had it been otherwise, they would have played a role, for instance against the Spartan invaders in 511/0, that would have secured them some mention in our sources. I presume, therefore, that numerically they were not very important (at least as time passed by, for in 546/5 the number of Thracian peltasts might well have been higher) and that the mainstay of the tyranny was not these barbarians but the corps of Greek *doruphoroi*, the core of which was made up by Peisistratos' Argive mercenaries.

6. Finally, the question of Athenians in the tyrants' army. Surely the *korunēphoroi* with whose help Peisistratos first seized the Akropolis were Athenians, as is stated by Herodotos (I 59.5-6; cf. *AthPol.* 14.1). But just as surely these were insufficient to guarantee Peisistratos' power for the long run. When that power was finally 'rooted', it was, as we have seen, thanks to 'many *epikouroi* and a lot of money' (Hdt. I 64.1) and even in the last years

of the tyranny we still hear of *epikouroi* serving in Athens (Thuc. VI 58.2). On the other hand, when the grandfathers of Athenians of the second half of the fifth century could have been among the *doruphoroi* of the tyrants, and when a comic chorus of Old Men could recollect memories of the time they fought for the tyrant, this certainly indicates that indeed Athenians must have been among the tyrants' troops. Surely one could argue that the grandfathers of the fifth-century Athenians had originally been foreigners who came to Athens as mercenaries and stayed on to be enfranchised later under one of Kleisthenes' reform measures. I believe such an enfranchisement of aliens and more precisely of former professional soldiers in the service of Hippias did indeed take place in 508/7 BC (cf. Bicknell 1969: 34-37), but it would be utterly implausible to connect these to all the references from a later period to Athenian *doruphoroi* serving the Peisistratids. So Athenians apparently did serve in the tyrants' army and Lavelle deserves credit for having established that fact. But the question naturally arises as to what extent the tyrants' forces were Athenian. Surely the *epikouroi* in our sources were foreigners, but the term *doruphoroi* could cover both Athenian and foreign hoplites. One cannot simply assume, as Lavelle does, that all or practically all *epikouroi* returned home after the victory at Pallene, and that the *doruphoroi* must all have been Athenians. The question, then, of who exactly were the tyrants' soldiers, is still unsolved. Summing up what we have found so far, we can say that after the establishment of Lygdamis as tyrant of Naxos Peisistratos' allies (in the strict sense of 'political friends') from Thebes, Eretria and Naxos itself must have gone home. For his own support Peisistratos maintained an unknown number of Thracian peltasts, later reinforced by some Scythian archers, as well as a troop of hoplites. The latter were in essence his Argive mercenaries, but now we can assume that Athenians also were admitted among their ranks. These *doruphoroi* were clearly the mainstay of the tyranny and they deserve a closer look.

CLUB-BEARERS, DUSTY-FEET, AND WOLF-FEET SOLDIERS

When Peisistratos seized power for the first time in 561/0 BC, we are told by Herodotos, he cheated the people (*dēmos*) on the *agora* into selecting for him a bodyguard, not of *doruphoroi*, but of *korunēphoroi* or 'club-bearers' (I 59.4-5). The *AthPol.* even mentions the detail that the decree in which the *phulakē* of *korunēphoroi* was approved had been drafted by one Aristion (14.1). Later sources mention the number of the guards: 50 or 300 men (see also above

under §2 and Rhodes 1981: 200). This is all curious information. I do not believe that the *AthPol.* had access to archive material supplying the name of Aristion. In fact, a written motion (to be passed as a decree by the people) is surely anachronistic. The whole episode of Aristion's decree must be invention, but the name Aristion itself can be historical and may simply be remembered because he was a well-known partisan of the tyrant (the possible connection with the Aristion whose gravestone from ca. 510 BC has been found in the area of Brauron – the east of Attika where Peisistratos had his 'home base' – is still debated, cf. Rhodes 1981: 200). The pseudo-Aristion decree demonstrates, however, that the story of Peisistratos' first *coup* could be easily embroidered upon. To my mind, this also applies to Herodotos' seemingly matter-of-fact statement about the 'club-bearers', that the people 'selected those men from the citizens who were not the *doruphoroi* of Peisistratos, but his *korunēphoroi*'. For this too suggests some invention or some manipulation of tradition.

Why should Herodotos have added the remark that these people were 'not the *doruphoroi*' of the tyrant? One can think of two possible reasons which are, moreover, not mutually exclusive. The first one is, that in the time of Herodotos it would have seemed odd, to say the least, that someone could have seized the Akropolis and thereby power over the whole state of Athens (Hdt. I 59.6) with the help of 'club-bearers'. For surely, even if these 'club-bearers' could have taken the fortress by surprise, they could never have held out against determined resistance from the better-armed citizens, *i.e.* the hoplites. Therefore some people would have it that Peisistratos actually received a guard of hoplites or *doruphoroi*, which would explain his seizure of power much better. Indeed, one of our later sources, the *scholion* to Plato *Rep.* 566B, calls his bodyguard *doruphoroi* and not *korunēphoroi*. It might be that Herodotos wanted to undermine that opinion and therefore emphasized their character of 'club-bearers'. The second reason one can think of is that in the later fifth century Athenian politicians could be attacked by their opponents for their grandfathers' supposedly 'traitorous' behaviour as *doruphoroi* of the tyrants (Lavelle 1992a: 93, and above). Herodotos, then, would have known of such rumours and considering them scandalous he found it necessary to emphasize that the bodyguards of Peisistratos had certainly not been *doruphoroi*. I suspect that Herodotos in so doing became the victim of some special pleading. One can still feel the apparent embarrassment behind his rather superfluous explanation of the term 'club-bearers' in the added words: 'for they used to follow him with wooden clubs' (I 59.5).

This is enough to make one think twice before swallowing Herodotos' story for fact.

The *korunēphoroi* of Peisistratos are indeed suspect for two reasons: as 'club-bearers' they simply cannot satisfactorily explain how Peisistratos could take and hold power in Athens; further, they are not the only *korunēphoroi* mentioned in the context of archaic tyrants and archaic political classes. Perhaps, by exploring that wider context, we find some hints of a new interpretation.

In Sikyon on the Peloponnese a class of people existed called *korunēphoroi* or *katonakophoroi*: 'club-bearers' or 'sheepskin-wearers' (Theopompos F176; Pollux III 83; Steph. of Byz. s.v. Χίος). They were poor freedmen or, possibly, liberated serfs (Theopompos compares them to the Spartan *epeunaktoi* who might have had the status of liberated helots). In any case, their nicknames are derived from the habitual clothes of the simple countryfolk who evidently could not afford the arms and armour of hoplites and therefore had to make do with big sticks or clubs. Curiously enough, we are told that the tyrants of Sikyon and likewise Peisistratos of Athens forbade the *korunēphoroi/katonakophoroi* to enter the city in another than their habitual boorish outfit (Theopompos F311; Pollux VII 68 – in the case of Peisistratos we may think of the traditions that he kept the agrarian population as far as possible away from the city, cf. Rhodes 1981: 214; the Athenian *korunēphoroi* then would refer to the whole class of the agrarian poor, i.e. those who did not live in the city itself). These people were the poor citizens, easily recognisable as such, and politically unemancipated. Comparable names for the underprivileged lower classes are found in Epidauros (the *konipodes* or 'dusty-feet', cf. Plut. *Mor.* 291E) and Argos (the *gumnētes* or *gumnēsioi*, 'naked ones', cf. Pollux III 83; Steph. of Byz. s.v. Χίος). Much has been made of these groups or classes as the supposed mainstay of archaic tyranny by Berve (who supposed that Kleisthenes of Sikyon also recruited a bodyguard of *korunēphoroi* – Berve 1967: 32) and Mossé (especially Mossé 1969: 23-47). But such reconstructions are unfounded as far as they presuppose well-defined political aims on the side of the (would-be) tyrants and of the lower classes, where probably opportunism was the rule on both sides. In the case of Peisistratos' bodyguard, it is tempting to assume that the term *korunēphoroi* first and foremost denoted a class of people and not, or not necessarily, a body of men armed with clubs. Let us remember the general situation in early sixth-century Athens. Hoplite equipment was then the mark of the rich: the *Hippeis* and *Pentakosiomedimnoi*; all other citizens had to improvise, if need be, with what

was at hand. So spears and bronze shields became the attributes of the upper classes, clubs and stones those of their social inferiors. The term *korunēphoroi* contains an oblique reference to *doruphoroi* (spear-bearers), the archaic equivalent of hoplites. It certainly did not become an official name like those of the Solonian *zeugitai* and *thētes*; but as long as the *zeugitai* were unable to serve as hoplites (and I believe they entered the ranks of the hoplite army mainly thanks to the reforms of Kleisthenes) they were militarily on a par with the *thētes*, both classes being essentially ‘unarmed’ and thus at best ‘club-bearers’. When by public decree (whatever that might have meant in 561 BC) a bodyguard for Peisistratos was to be formed, recruitment from the upper classes for such a standing corps was no doubt equally unthinkable as recruitment of foreigners. The bodyguard therefore had necessarily to come from among the non-hoplites or ‘club-bearers’ and thus from the agrarian poor (the term *astoi* in Hdt. I 59.5 could mean ‘men of the city’ – like οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἄσπεος in 63.1 – or ‘citizens’ as in I 67.5; the former sense would imply some form of ‘city-proletariat’ here which is unlikely, so the latter should be preferred). It does not follow, however, that they remained in that position and accompanied Peisistratos ‘with their wooden clubs’ up to the Akropolis, as Herodotos wants us to believe. Perhaps also in the wording of *AthPol.* 14.1 we find a hint that the ‘so-called club-bearers’ – τοὺς κορυνηφόρους καλουμένους – were not really ‘club-bearers’ at all. It is much more plausible that Peisistratos himself made hoplites, *i.e.* *doruphoroi*, of his *korunēphoroi*. By procuring equipment for them he could make them into a loyal troop of soldiers with the help of which he could indeed hope to rule Athens.

Initially he was successful, for he seized the Akropolis and held power in the city ‘for a short time’ (Hdt. I 60.1). We do not know how short that was – according to *AthPol.* 14.3 the first tyranny lasted about five years (*cf.* Rhodes 1981: 191–199 for the chronological problems) – but the easiest explanation for Peisistratos’ failure in his first tyranny might have been money. Not only did he have to procure arms and weapons for his bodyguard, he also had to find the means for maintaining his troops on a permanent basis. It might be this failure that drove him first into the arms of the Alkmaionidai and ultimately abroad in order there to find the finances necessary for a ‘modern’ army of professional soldiers, *i.e.* hoplites (and some peltasts) and certainly not ‘club-bearers’. What happened in the meantime to the men thus raised to hoplite status by Peisistratos, we do not know. Probably, though, they were forced to retire to the countryside where they had come from and

where, one can imagine, they would rally again to Peisistratos' cause the moment he appeared with an army in Attika in 546/5. In any case, during Peisistratos' very short second tyranny they are not heard of, probably because that was based solely on political alliances and (mis)calculations. After the campaign resulting in the victory at Pallene and Peisistratos' final takeover, as we have seen, his friends and allies from Thebes, Eretria and Naxos would have returned home shortly afterwards, but the troops hired in Thrace and in Argive territory – those explicitly called 'mercenaries' in our sources – would have stayed on in the tyrant's pay. The barbarian peltasts apart, is there anything more to say of the Argives otherwise than that they were *doruphoroi*? And what can have been the relation between these foreign hoplites and the Athenian *doruphoroi* that had served the tyrants according to later testimonies?

We have an intriguing piece of information on the question of the tyrants' *doruphoroi* in a few lines of Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (665-668) and the *scholia ad loc.* (Hopper 1960: 242-247; Bing 1976/77: 308-316). There the chorus of Old Men exhort each other under the name of *leukopodes* ('white-foot' or 'dusty-foot', see below) to attack the Akropolis as they once did Leipsydrion. The *scholia* go on to explain the term *lukopodes* (our manuscripts of the *Lysistrata* have *lukopodes* instead of *leukopodes*, which must, however, be a corruption, since the metrum requires a long syllable, thus *leu-*) with the following statements (Hopper 1960: 243-244; Bing 1976/77: 309): "As Aristotle says (=Aristotle F394 Rose) the *doruphoroi* of the tyrants were called *lukopodes*. For they made a bodyguard of the young men from among the servants. They were called *lukopodes* because they had their feet always wrapped in wolfskins to avoid being scorched by the ground. Others explain the name *lukopodes* by the blazon of a wolf they had on their shields." Further, we hear that the *lukopodes* were said by Aristophanes to be the Alkmaionidai who fortified Leipsydrion against the tyrant Hippias. But that certainly is a misreading of the lines of the *Lysistrata*. There can be no doubt that the *lukopodes* or *leukopodes* were the men who attacked Leipsydrion and thus fought for the tyrant against the Alkmaionidai (Bing 1976/77: 310-311; Lavelle 1992a: 93; *pace* Hopper 1960: 246). As to their correct name, Aristophanes must have called them *leukopodes*, but the information in the *scholia* is so emphatic about a corps of *doruphoroi* in the service of the tyrants and recruited from among *oiketai* or 'servants', which was styled *lukopodes*, that it would be unwarranted to reject that information out of hand. Therefore we are left with two possible solutions: either the Old Men refer to

the tyrants' guard of *lukopodes* and the term *leukopodes* is just a pun on that name (a pun with a very real undertone, for the infantry soldiers certainly had dusty or 'white' feet, but it could also have a social connotation, see below), or the information in the *scholia* about the *lukopodes* of the tyrants is independent of the verses of the *Lysistrata* where the Old Men merely refer to the 'white-feet' soldiers who once attacked Leipsydrion. The former possibility would perhaps better explain how the corruption in our manuscripts (from *leukopodes* to *lukopodes*) could arise, but would also imply that by the time of the *Lysistrata* people still knew that the standing force of hoplites during the tyrants had been called *lukopodes*. This to me does not seem very probable and I prefer to see in the information in the *scholia* on the *lukopodes* the influence of Aristotelian or Atthidographic scholarship which then via the *scholia* found its way into the manuscripts. This leaves us with two pieces of information: 1. A comic chorus of Old Men could recollect the time that Athenian infantry fought for the tyrants against the men in Leipsydrion (emphasized by Lavelle 1992a: 93). 2. During the tyranny there existed in Athens a troop of professional soldiers, hoplites nicknamed *lukopodes*, in the personal service of the Peisistratids (emphasized by Bing 1976/77: 311-313).

To start with the latter, who were these *lukopodes*? It is very tempting to follow Bing in his identification of these hoplites with the mercenaries brought by Peisistratos from Argos. He takes them to have been named after their shields that must have carried wolf-emblems. This makes it possible to connect these troops with the wolf on Argive coins and more specifically with the cult of *Apollo Lukeios*. That cult was Argive in origin and brought to Athens by the Argive mercenaries of the tyrant. To accommodate for his troops' needs Peisistratos had the sanctuary of *Apollo Lukeios* built just outside the city of Athens, with a gymnasium added, that served as a rallying ground for these hoplites. After the tyranny it continued to serve this purpose for the citizen-hoplites of Athens, who were wont to assemble there for parades, inspection and departure on campaign (Bing 1976/77: 311-313).

This is certainly an attractive reconstruction and in its main outlines convincing enough. Especially the connection between an older cult of *Apollo Lukeios* in Argos and the Athenian *Lukeion*, which is attributed to Peisistratos (Theopompos F136; Paus. I 19.3-4), to my mind corroborates the supposition that Peisistratos' Argive hoplites stayed on in Athens on a permanent basis. This too makes it very probable to identify these Argives with the *epikouroi* of Hippias mentioned by Thuc. VI 58.2, if not with most of that tyrant's *doruphoroi* referred to by Thucydides (VI 56.2; 57.1 and 57.4). Also the

continuity between the tyrants' hoplite force and the citizen-army of democratic Athens, both using the *Lukeion* for their parade grounds, is striking. Still, one keeps wondering why the Argives were called *lukopodes*. Bing assumes that it was after their shields with wolf-emblems and he points to Argive coins with wolf-effigies (Bing 1976/77: 312). But in the fifth century the city of Argos almost certainly had no wolf for a blazon on the shields of its hoplites (Soph. *Antig.* 106 evokes white shields, which suggests that the wolves as emblems were unknown at least to Sophocles and his audience, cf. Anderson 1970: 18). The whole question of archaic and classical shield blazons deserves a thorough investigation. At the moment one cannot say that wolves appear in significant numbers on shields in Attic vase painting of the sixth century. Moreover, even if the wolf had been the blazon of Peisistratos' mercenaries, the term *luko-podes* (instead of, conceivably, *lukaspides*) is still odd. Bing's suggestion that *-podes* might be explained as analogous to Latin *pedites*, 'foot soldiers' (Bing 1976/77: 312 n.19) is rather desperate. Clearly its derivation was also unknown to the scholiast who gives two possible explanations, the first one of which (the name derived from the wolfskins wrapped around the soldiers' feet) is naive, to say the least. I believe neither the supposed emblems on their shields, nor the fanciful wolfskins around the soldiers' legs (a wolfskin was worth five drachms in the early sixth century and thus a lot of money, since it was the same as the price of an ox, if we can believe Demetrios of Phaleron in Plut. *Sol.* 23.3) can explain the name *lukopodes* satisfactorily.

Perhaps new light could be thrown on the problem by establishing to what social class these soldiers belonged. Hoplites from Argos could, on the face of it, be considered as Argive citizens of hoplite status. But that is unlikely for at least two reasons. Firstly, because there is nothing to suggest that Argos by the mid-sixth century BC had already so many hoplites that it could let a considerable number ('thousand' according to *AthPol.* 17.4) go abroad for years (one should remember the position of Argos on the Peloponnese, threatened as it then was by Sparta); in general the situation cannot have been very different from that in Attika where only the élite of society could afford to equip themselves as hoplites. Secondly, even if Argive citizens of hoplite status lent themselves for service in Peisistratos' army, it is inconceivable that these men, on all accounts Argive citizens of some means, would have stayed in Athens as a paid garrison of the tyrant for the following years or even decades. Argive *doruphoroi*, therefore, must have come from the lower classes, exactly as the Athenian *korunēphoroi* from whose midst Peisistratos

recruited his first bodyguard. It must have been men desperate enough to leave their country more or less permanently to follow a leader who promised them a secured livelihood, in fact just as desperate as all those Greeks in the archaic age who followed an oikist to found a colony somewhere far away from the motherland. Such people were not hoplites from the start; they were made into hoplites by the tyrant or would-be tyrant who provided them with their essential spears and shields. In the *schol. ad Lysistr.* 665 we are told that they had been *oiketai* or 'servants': the term could equally well apply to hired mercenaries as to people 'in between slavery and freedom', as the 'club-bearers', 'dusty-feet' and the like are styled in our sources (Lotze 1959: 53-56).

When Peisistratos made a bodyguard of *doruphoi* from a following of poor Athenian 'club-bearers', he paid for it, conceivably, out of his own and his Athenian friends' resources; to equip and maintain the troop of Argives that almost certainly was bigger or even much bigger than his first bodyguard, required larger means. These he assembled from his temporary footholds in Thrace and elsewhere in the north (on the Thermaic Gulf, cf. Viviers 1987: 193-195) and from friends and allies practically all over Greece. In both cases one could say that the tyrant raised people from the lower classes to the level of the near-aristocracy by providing them with the equipment that was the mark of the higher strata of society (only the possession of horses would have marked a man for even higher status).

If the Athenian *korunēphoroi* and the Argive mercenaries were so to speak socially on a par, perhaps the name of *luko-podes* becomes a little more transparent. The *korunēphoroi* in Attika had their equivalent, as we have seen above, in the *korunēphoroi* or *katonakophoroi* of Sikyon, the *gumnētes* of Argos, the *konipodes* of Epidauros, and doubtless in comparable groups in many other states. For all we know, Peisistratos' mercenaries may have been recruited from the same *gumnētes* or *gumnēsioi* who could also be styled *konipodes* in neighbouring Epidauros. When they came to Athens as hoplites in the service of Peisistratos they found themselves, in a sense, in between two classes: they were separated from the Athenian lower classes of *zeugitai* and *thētes* (together the non-hoplite class of 'club-bearers') by their superior equipment, although they shared the same social background; they were cut off from the upper classes by that same background, as well as by their non-Athenian origins and their cult of Apollo Lukeios, although they had the status of hoplites in common. They had been 'dusty-feet' and sheepskin-wearers at home, now they had become *doruphoroi* and the martial followers

of Apollo the Killer of Wolves. Perhaps they called themselves ‘wolf-feet’, half in pride and half in self-mockery, to emphasize the transformation they had undergone from dusty-feet to the ‘feet’ belonging to Apollo’s ‘wolves’ (if indeed they had wolf-blazons on their shields, the evidence for which is lacking), or to the ‘feet’ going to and so to say ‘belonging to’ the sanctuary of Apollo Lukeios. But perhaps the name was given to them by the Athenian population, also half in mockery and half in respect. There is an opposition here between various elements: between the club-bearers and the spear-bearers, between the dusty-feet and the wolf-feet, between the sheep and the wolves, in all cases: between the unarmed and poor on the one hand and the well-armed on the other, or, more poignantly, between prey (the ‘sheep’ in the sheepskin-wearers) and predator (the ‘wolves’ in the ‘wolf-feet’ soldiers). The *lukopodes* had once been of the first category, but in the service of the tyrant they had risen to the second.

Returning to the Athenian *leukopodes* of *Lysistrata* 665, these ‘white-feet’ or ‘dusty-feet’ now sound a little more familiar. Perhaps Aristophanes did not mean very much with this term (‘white feet’ as ‘old feet’ fitting for Old Men?), or perhaps he intended a pun on *lukopodes* (but, as stated above, that does not seem very probable); more likely, though, he referred to a vocabulary already conventional that denoted the professional soldiers of the tyrants not for their military equipment but for their social background. The ‘white-feet’ soldiers then belong to the same category as the ‘club-bearers’ and the ‘dusty-feet’. As soldiers they were *doruphoroi*, but that did not seem to be as noteworthy as their background in the ‘common people’. It is this, I believe, that made the ‘white-feet’ attractive to be conjured up by the comic poet’s patriotic chorus – not their action against the enemies of the tyrants, since all the pros and cons of Peisistratids and Alkmaionidai are to some extent muddled up in this play (Hopper 1960: 246).

The ‘white-feet’ then were Athenians who fought for the tyrants. We have to assume, therefore, that Peisistratos and his sons had the corps of Argive hoplites kept up in strength or even enlarged by admissions of Athenian citizens. By the time of Leipsydriion the Athenians might even have formed a majority in it. They became, like the Argives, the professional *doruphoroi* of the Peisistratids. As such they very probably did not come from the citizens of hoplite status, but from the lower classes of society, the same stratum from which the Argive mercenaries and earlier still the Athenian ‘so-called club-bearers’ had been recruited. These men owed their fortunes to the tyrant. Perhaps that made their service more offensive in the eyes of some Athenians

of a later age. On the other hand, as long as the citizens of the higher classes had not been disarmed (which happened probably as late as 514, see above), sometimes these too may have had to lend their services to the state, *i.e.* to the tyrants. The campaign in Boiotia in 519 might have been such an occasion. In any case, in later memory the issues became blurred, some individuals could be blamed for their grandfathers' behaviour (Lavalle 1992: 93), while others could remember with pride their service as 'common men soldiers' against the then enemies of the tyranny.

CONCLUSION

To sum up. Peisistratos seized power in Athens for the first time with the help of a troop of citizens from the poorer and non-hoplite classes (the 'club-bearers') whom he made into hoplites. This force, however, and Peisistratos' financial resources proved too weak to hold power in the long run. After an intermezzo in alliance with the Alkmaionidai Peisistratos set out to raise new troops and more funds abroad. In this he was overwhelmingly successful and after a short campaign he was able to 'root' his power firmly in Athens. His forces in the campaign of 546/5 had consisted of allies from Thebes, Eretria and Naxos, of mercenaries from the region of Pangaion in Thrace and from Argos, and of Athenian partisans who joined him after his landing in Attika. When victory was won, his allies went home, while Peisistratos kept his Thracian peltasts and Argive hoplites to prop up his rule. As time went by, the numbers of Thracians and Argives probably declined; some Scythian archers, on the other hand, were brought to Athens, and poor Athenians were admitted into the standing force of *doruphoroi* in (probably) increasing numbers. Those citizens who could equip themselves as hoplites were presumably not disarmed until 514. After that opposition grew. In the face of the Spartan menace Hippias called in the help of Thessalian horsemen, but when these suffered defeat against king Kleomenes' army in 510 the tyrant retired to the Akropolis preparing for a siege which did not last long: since his children had been captured Hippias surrendered the fortress and left Attika.

What could be called the strategy of the Peisistratids had some interesting social and political implications. In his rise to power and during his tyranny Peisistratos had effectively enlarged that body of citizens that served as hoplites. Before his first *coup* only the two highest classes in Athens had been hoplites; thanks to Peisistratos an unknown but surely small number of lower class Athenians were raised to hoplite status as well. That strategy was

continued during and after the campaign of Pallene. In the end at least hundreds of lower class Argives and lower class Athenians became hoplites. Most probably during the upheavals of 508/507 the Alkmaionid Kleisthenes continued Peisistratos' policy of admitting new groups to the citizen-hoplite army: in fact it must have been under his reforms that the *zeugitai* became regularly hoplites, thus creating the largely non-aristocratic hoplite army of the classical age. At the same time the Argive (and possibly other foreign) hoplites who had been in the tyrants' service were enfranchised, thereby stiffening the new army of democratic Athens, which inherited also the *Lukeion* as its military rallying point. All this throws new light on wider topics: the nature of archaic tyranny and its relations with the lower classes of society (tyrants like the Peisistratids in search of military support recruited from these lower classes troops which they then transformed into hoplites) and the mechanisms by which the so-called hoplite class in late archaic Greece was gradually extended – not, as far as we can ascertain, by individuals acquiring more property and being individually admitted to the socially higher circle of the hoplites, but, so to speak, from above: by political decisions made by politicians often in conflict with rivals to admit collectively whole troops or whole census classes into the body of citizen-hoplites. When that extension had reached a certain point that body seized to be elitist and became representative of much wider segments of the population. This was the case under Kleisthenes and it created the conditions for Athenian democracy. In this, however, the democratic leader followed in the footsteps of the tyrants.